Subscription shares of the early 18 th century were early examples of what today would be called innovated securities. Either by intent or happenstance, they served to overcome imperfections in the capital markets of the day. Not all such securities were, however, alike. The prominent examples of the subscription shares of the South Sea Company and the Royal African Company in 1720 were quiet different in their design and the corporate financial policies they were intended to aid. The historical literature emphasises the importance of irrational pricing behaviour during the South Sea Bubble, yet it is remarkable that in the financial markets of 1720 the relative values of subscription shares are easily understandable using standard financial theory. Either by intent or happenstance, they served to overcome imperfections in the capital markets of the day. Not all such securities were, however, alike. The prominent examples of the subscription shares of the South Sea Company and the Royal African Company in 1720 were quiet different in their design and the corporate financial policies they were intended to aid. The historical literature emphasises the importance of irrational pricing behaviour during the South Sea Bubble, yet it is remarkable that in the financial markets of 1720 the relative values of subscription shares are easily understandable using standard financial theory.
Introduction
Financial market efficiency can be impaired by a combination of irrational pricing behaviour and limits upon arbitrageurs' ability to eliminate the resulting mispricings of financial assets. In the critique of financial market efficiency that has come to be called behavioural finance, a rigorously defined example of irrational behaviour is noise trading -trading that is highly correlated with what can only be called noiselike movements in security prices. The theoretical explanations for hypothesised noise trading are varied; misperceptions of correct prices can arise from a number of psychological biases in perceptions of risk and return or arise from a utility of risk and return that is heavily biased towards loss aversion. Arbitrageurs can, however, overcome the risk attendant in facing noise traders if arbitrage is sufficiently well financed or there is sufficient time to deliver the required returns to arbitrageurs.
Instances of successful arbitrage arise therefore in markets in which a simple form (at least) of market efficiency arises. In the next section of this paper, we review in brief this literature with regards to speculative, and possible arbitrage, activities of certain institutions and individuals. The summary conclusion that we take from this literature is that individuals and institutions did not succeed or fail as investors by trying to exploit mis-pricings between very similar securities. That would have been arbitrage. They either succeeded or failed, by luck or design, in the way they viewed the intertemporal movement in the market fundamental for shares. Further archival researches might yet find direct evidence of individual attempts at profitable arbitrage, but we do not think that such evidence is likely to be found.
Subscription shares have been referred to also as subscription contracts. They were share purchase agreements that required a down-payment and subsequent payments to follow in scheduled instalments. Subsequent events in 1720 and in later 4 years suggest, however, that the general investing public did not necessarily see these contracts as simple instalment purchase contracts for shares, at least as far as South Sea shares were concerned. There is good evidence to suggest that the investing public viewed the South Sea subscription contracts as complex packages of call options on shares. In this paper we demonstrate that the Royal African Company avoided these problems with its subscription shares with a combination of good luck and prudent financial management. An option to default on subscription instalments was embedded in both South Sea and Royal African subscription shares, but because of the terms of their issue, maturity and the companies' respective management policies, the default option was practically worthless in the Royal African subscription shares, whereas it obtained high values in the South Sea subscription shares.
Literature regarding speculation and arbitrage in 1720
In this section we review what little recent literature there is that reflects upon individual (or institutional) speculation and arbitrage. In the course of the review, it will become clear why it is so unlikely that archives will produce clear cases of arbitrage by individuals and institutions. Evidence of arbitrage will have to be discovered in other ways than by looking at investor case histories.
It has now been confirmed that John Law wrote a series of very large call options on East India shares for Lord Londonderry (Thomas Pitt). The exercise of these options were variously due in the middle to early autumn of 1720 and Neal (2000) writes of the difficulties that Law's agents had in honouring the calls. These difficulties strongly suggest that Law did not construct hedges against the risks he faced in writing these calls. In today's terms he was writing "naked" calls, which exposed him to liabilities that could only be capped by the limited extent to which East India shares could rise in value. Although we have few details, it also appears that by early 1720 Law was the author of some very large naked calls in South Sea 5 shares as well. The correspondence with his London banker suggests that these calls were very strongly in the money and about to expire to the great financial embarrassment of their author. Londonderry, for his part, appeared to be in a position in which he had to receive the settlement of the calls directly from Law's agents or receive nothing at all. Whether by design or necessity, Londonderry was to receive settlement of the calls by paying the exercise price and by taking possession of the shares. We know that Londonderry had earlier sold pieces of the call options he held to others, but he was still left in possession of a large quantity of these options.
Londonderry obviously felt that he faced a very specific risk that Law would not be able to deliver on his calls and he even found it in his own interests to aid Law's agents in placing the shares at advantageous prices. Neal shows how Londonderry took appreciable steps to reduce the risks he faced, but these risks were quite unique risks because he was in possession of such a large number of in-the-money calls written by just one very wealthy and politically-powerful individual. Richard Cantillon's financial contracts were extensive and varied, but it is impossible here too to place them within the context of arbitrage strategies. To take just one of the examples analysed by Murphy (1986) , between March and May 1720
Cantillon concentrated on the exchange rate policies being followed by John Law in his administration of the Mississippi Scheme. He made substantial loans to a number of individuals, but primarily to various members of the Powis family, Lady Mary Herbert and her father, Lord Montgomery. The value of these loans to Cantillon would have appreciated in the event of devaluation of French banknotes relative to specie, yet the collateral he accepted for these loans were in the form of Mississippi Company shares. Cantillon clearly expected that, because of the system being followed by Law, the value of Mississippi shares would rise or fall pari passu with the exchange rate between banknotes and specie, yet there is no apparent evidence 6 that he was concerned with risk that the collateral value for his loans would be low n value in the very circumstances in which he would likely have to retain the collateral.
Sir Thomas Guy built the fortune that lay behind the charitable foundation of Sir Thomas Guy's Hospital by simply selling South Sea shares steadily into the rising market of early 1720. The largest known investor in English funds, the Canton of Berne, also did very well in 1720 by steadily selling South Sea shares that it had purchased in 1719. In the latter case there was a clear statement that the motive behind the strategy was simply to hold a low-risk portfolio. The financial directorate of the Canton viewed the rapid rise in South Sea share prices in early 1720 as a signal that the riskiness of South Sea shares were suddenly much higher than it had heretofore expected and the shares were peremptorily dumped (Altorfer, 2004) . On a comparatively small scale, Hoare's Bank purchased shares before the steepest run-up in prices and managed to sell a good portion of these shares before the market collapsed. Temin and Voth (2003) present a case that this was the result of a precocious trading strategy of "riding the bubble".
Pure arbitrage requires the arbitrageur to take opposite positions in two assets that are precisely alike. Perhaps a bit easier to find are two assets, nearly alike in all respects except in their riskinesses. If there is a reward towards bearing risk that is easier for arbitrageurs to carry than for other persons in the markets to carry, another type of arbitrage -risk arbitrage might be detectable. Most likely this is the arbitrage in which Richard Cantillon and John Law were engaged if they were engaged in arbitrage at all.
The other way to discover arbitrage is to analyse values for financial instruments that are very close substitutes for each other in order to look for mispricings or successful arbitrage that prevents such mis-pricings. In this paper we consider the arbitrage relationship between fully-paid equity shares and subscription 7 shares. They were issued variously by many companies in the 18 th and 19 th centuries.
It was common in the late 18 th and early 19th centuries that canal, railway and insurance companies would issue new equity shares on a subscription basis. This practice was followed by a number of new and existing companies in 1720 as well.
What we shall examine in this paper are the unique arbitrage possibilities when subscription shares were issued and traded in parallel with fully-paid shares.
This paper is the third in a series that concerns the role of subscription finance during the South Sea Bubble. The first paper (Shea (2007a) was the different financial management policies followed by the two companies that determined why in one set of markets the Royal African share values followed a joint linear process and in other markets the South Sea share values followed a distinctly joint nonlinear process.
Royal African Company Subscription Shares
The Royal African Company subscription share issue of 1720 arose from a capital enlargement scheme that was called an "engraftment". The engraftment was first described very briefly, but quite accurately by DuBois (1938) . 2 Our description of the details of the engraftment is more extensive than that given by DuBois, but we base our description on the same two important sources he used. The first is an indenture agreement between the Company and a group of trustees who would administer the engraftment. The scheme is completely described in this indenture agreement and, for citation purposes, we have reproduced it in full in Appendix 1.
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The second important source is a 1724 report by the trustees to the Company on the effects and management of the engraftment up to that point. For citation purposes again, this document is reproduced in full in Appendix 2. After years of losses and deteriorating trading conditions caused by competitors and war (see Carlos and Kruse, 1996) , it sought to refinance and revive its trade in the buoyant stock markets of early 1720. The new capital was to be in the form of equity and the new equity was to be offered to the public. Company of its subscription issues.
The Engraftment Defined
The indenture makes the usual 18 th -Century distinction between assets ("stock") and equity claims on assets ("shares" 6 The indenture states that the best estimated value for all original assets is £240,000 (A.1, lines 38-39), but original shareholders will own only £107,600 of the £500,000 new book value, so they must be compensated £132,400 (= £240,000 -£107,600) out of the £392,400 paid by newly subscribing shareholders (A.1, lines 43-49).
The uses to which this £132,400 are to be put are also described. It is to be split into two basic funds -£80,000 and £52,400. The £80,000 is for the discharge of a long list of enumerated debts amounting to as much as £75,696. This sum is to be delivered But the Royal African engraftment worked just about as planned: nearly the whole sums of monies projected to be raised, were raised; the costs of administering the engraftment were contained within the amounts budgeted and all old creditors to the company had been paid in full. This was all accomplished in the difficult financial conditions that followed with the collapse of the South Sea scheme. 
Provisions for Protecting Original Shareholder Wealth
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funds to the Company's officers in full and in a timely fashion. If for any reason he failed in these tasks, the original shareholders would be the losers. We shall now look at some more features of the indenture agreement to see how these problems were overcome.
Making the Indenture Work -the Role of Underpricing
The indenture agreement was clearly designed to maximise the chances that all its terms would be fulfilled. Joseph Taylor was allowed to collect subscriptions for new shares (A.1, lines 142-150). We do not know how he allocated new shares, but the offer terms were clearly designed to make sure the subscription would be filled.
The task facing Mr. Taylor was to define a group of people who could subscribe for shares which, we have already calculated, would have an expected market value of about £33 p.s. These persons would have rights to these shares by paying the special price (the rights price) defined in the indenture agreement. By setting the rights price (£25 p.s.) to a number well below the expected value of shares, the writers of the indenture made sure that Mr. Taylor's solicitation of subscriptions would be easy. The second set of features of the subscription shares that would have made them popular is that they were issued in small denominations and in large numbers. Our analytical approach to understanding the prices of Royal African subscription shares uses a simple graphical device, which provides a direct measure of the value of an option to default upon subscription instalments. It is a graphical depiction of what can be called an arbitrage bound and it is complicated only by the existence of the uncertain dividend that was promised to original shareholders in the indenture agreement. We first pose a counterfactual situation in which the subscription shares were simply fractional claims upon ex-dividend fully-paid shares.
To take an example, compare the value of subscription shares and fully-paid shares on 1 June, 1720. On that date a £5 instalment was due on the subscription shares, but there were still to be paid another £5 (due 1 September) and a final £7 (due 1 December). We suppose therefore that on 2 June a subscription share would represent a fractional (£13/£25) claim on a fully-paid share that was shorn of its expected dividend; the value of that would be (£13/£25)×(P 
South Sea Company Subscription Shares
At the probable height of equity values in late June 1720, subscription shares accounted for at least 10 percent of all South Sea Company equity value and could have eventually accounted for 15 percent of all South Sea equity. They were issued to meet the immediate cash needs of the firm. Some of the cash would have had to be used in the exchange packages the Company was offering to government annuitants, but by far the largest use of the cash was in the form of loans to shareholders who were pledging their shares as collateral for loans.
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The subscription shares were shares issued to the public and they could be purchased in instalments. deposit on a share that was to be priced at £1000. Nine further semi-annual instalments of £100 each would be required before a fully-paid share was credited to the owner. 15 The 4 th subscription did not commence until 12 August and it too was priced at £1000 p.s.
The issue prices for subscription shares were at the level or slightly above the values for fully-paid shares at their respective dates of issue. The consequence of this is that, 13 In Add. Ms. 25, 499, South Sea Company. Court Minutes No. 6 , page 104, for 21 April 1720 we have one of the more remarkable statements from the directors of the Company concerning their intended financial management of the firm. The disposition of cash from the sale of subscription shares figures prominently in their statements. 14 The 18 th and 19 th century usage of the term "call" often refers to a request for the payment from either a subscriber or an existing shareholder. That is how we shall use the term in this paper and not as reference to a call option. 15 A history of the instalment schedules for these shares is found in Supplementary Appendix 3 (Shea, 2007a) . throughout most of the subscription shares' subsequent trading lives, South Sea fullypaid share prices were actually very low relative to the subscription prices. This was quite different from the situation for the Royal African subscription shares, whose issue price was set much lower than the fully-paid shares' price at the time of issue. Another significant way in which the South Sea subscriptions differed from those of the Royal African Company was in their rights to dividends. Nearly from the beginning of their issue, the South Sea Company declared that subscription shares would share in any dividends equally with fully-paid shares. Table 1 The option to default is a put option, but we have not tried to model directly its value. The principle of put-call parity, however, does state that when we have a put option, we can define a corresponding call option that has the same exercise price as the put, whose value is directly calculable from the value of the put. It is that corresponding call option whose values we have successfully modelled and estimated in our previous work (Shea, 2007b) . The call option is identified with the South Sea subscription shares themselves, which we have modelled as compound call options. It 22 is on the basis of the success we have had in modelling the values of the South Sea subscription shares with the compound call option model that allows us to conclude that we have also successfully explained the value of the default/put option possessed by South Sea subscription shares.
Conclusions
Textbook exercises in corporate finance show the student the many ways in which new equity can be raised in efficient markets without any adverse effects upon original shareholders' wealth. A good example is the issue of shares by rights to original shareholders. It makes no difference what the rights price is, whether it is above market value or book value of shares, the effects of the rights issue are always wealth-neutral because the firm's equity remains 100 percent-owned by the original shareholders. 16 The problem of the refinancing of the Royal African Company in 1720
was that its original owners were not numerous enough nor wealthy enough to provide the four-fold expansion in equity that was required by the firm's management. The Royal African's solution to this problem was the issue of an innovated security that was priced and managed in ways that allowed it to be sold to such large numbers of new capitalists so that it could raise a fund to compensate original shareholders for the foreseeable declines in the value of their shares. The new equity raised was transparently applied to extinguish debts and to make a cash payout to original shareholders so that their wealth was unaffected and, most importantly, could be foreseen to be unaffected. The result was that an easy-to-understand arbitrage relationship between original shares and the innovated subscription shares was established. The evidence shows that any profitable arbitrage opportunities were efficiently extinguished in the stock markets of 1720. A close modern parallel to the 23 Royal African case is the efficient arbitrage between fully-paid shares and instalment receipts found in many Commonwealth countries today (see Pinder, 1998 and Charupat and Prisman, 2004 ).
In the South Sea Company's case the innovated securities, the subscription shares, had a bit different design and were certainly applied to very different uses than were the Royal African subscription shares. Yet the evidence shows that these securities were also the objects of no less efficient arbitrage than were the Royal African subscription shares. The South Sea subscription shares fall somewhere between modern instalment receipts and the shares of modern no-liability (NL) mining companies (Morris, 1997). In the pricing of modern instalment receipts there is a detectable cost to preventing default, but it is very small. The largest component of any premium that is commanded by modern instalment receipts stems from the leverage they embody for any investor who might be credit-constrained (Charupat and Prisman 2004 ). It appears that South Sea subscription shares were similarly attractive to credit-constrained investors (Shea 2007a) . But unlike modern instalment receipts, the costs of preventing instalment defaults on South Sea subscription shares were huge. In this way they were more like instalment shares in NL mining companies, for which there is no provision for the prevention of default (Morris 1997). Because the South Sea Company set issue prices so very high relative to the market value of fullypaid shares, the default option contained within their subscription shares became quite
valuable. Yet it appears that these options too were adequately valued so that no profitable arbitrage opportunities arose between South Sea subscription shares and fully-paid shares.
We conclude that the best evidence collectible on arbitrage in 1720 suggests that, upon a comparison of two distinct, but related markets for innovated securities, 
